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When General Suharto stepped down on May 2 1 ,1998, the reaction in the streets 
was camivalesque. In Yogyakarta, a center of anti-Suharto demonstrations, sidewalks 
surged with excited crowds. Taking advantage of the festive mood, an enterprising 
photographer blew up an image of the fifty thousand rupiah bill that bears Suharto's 
face. Cutting out the former president, he left a large round hole and charged people to 
have their picture taken in the former president's place. Other photographers did the 
same with the Suharto postage stamp and with the official presidential poster that 
had watched over government offices, workplaces, restaurants, and homes. People 
lined up to put themselves or their kids in Suharto's newly vacated post. In one case, a 
photographer placed a placard beneath the poster saying, "Next President of 
Indonesia."2 In this moment of opened possibility, it was as if anyone could be 
president.
* Thanks are due to Nancy Florida, Laura Kunreuther, Rachel Sherman, Ann Laura Staler, and an 
anonymous reader for this journal for their insightful comments on earlier drafts.
2 In June 1998, an artist named Yuswantoro Adi did a performance art piece in which he used the fify 
thousand rupiah bill with a hole in it for people to pose in. The title of the installation was: "Anybody Can 
Be President" (Siapa Saja Boleh Jadi Presiden). In December 1998, he exhibited a series of paintings at 
Bentara Budaya, Yogyakarta, with the theme of "money and children." The image of children on the face of 
bills not only suggests the exploitation of children under capitalism, but also imposes a sign of authenticity 
(the innocent child) onto a sign of authority lacking moral legitimacy. One painting showed the fifty 
thousand rupiah bill with the artist's face in Suharto's place with the words underneath, "Not Father
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This was "euphoria": an English word (like most of the key words associated with 
democracy and reform in current Indonesian discourse) that was repeated over and 
over again in the press. Suharto was replaceable and his image no longer sacred. Back 
in the spring of 1998, student demonstrators in Yogyakarta calling for the aging 
dictator's resignation had burned him in effigy—at the time, a dangerous and daring 
act. The effigy's face was constructed from Suharto's official presidential portrait. 
Photographs of the burning effigy circulated among students and activists, but no local 
newspapers dared to publish it.3 Then, following Suharto's fall from power, everything 
changed. Newspapers gleefully showed pictures of these official posters crumpled in 
garbage heaps. The press printed photographs of student protesters arrested for 
causing a traffic jam, who appeared in court wearing masks made from photocopies of 
Suharto's face. When asked by the judge to remove the paper masks, they refused, 
saying, "We will take off our masks when Suharto, for whom the proof of wrongdoing 
is already very clear, appears in this court. Meanwhile, although it is not clear what we 
did wrong, we are the ones brought to court."4
Here, I examine two kinds of popular political communication that emerged in the 
so-called euphoric moment of the post-Suharto and pre-Abdurrachman Wahid period: 
campaign stickers in the form of fifty thousand rupiah bills and statements of support 
for Megawati Sukarnoputri in the form of blood fingerprints collected on cloth banners. 
Together, money stickers and blood fingerprints illuminate the dilemmas of Indonesian 
political communication during an inchoate period in which new opportunities for 
political expression bumped up against enduring structures of exclusion. I view them 
as attempts to bridge a gap in communication between political elites and "the 
people" (rakyat) through popular appropriations of elite signs of power. In money 
stickers and blood fingerprints, the iconography of the state is reinvented and charged 
with the task of expressing popular political sentiment. Money stickers and blood 
fingerprints reveal that in a moment of transition, signs of authenticity are up for grabs 
and at stake in the struggle to establish new political authority. Oscillating in a double 
gesture of irreverent mockery and genuine desire for authenticity, these popular forms 
of political communication provoke a tremor of unease in existing structures of 
authority.
Development" (Father Development was one of Suharto's chosen titles) and "32 Years Indonesia is Just 
Awakening" (a play on the Indonesian word for "development," which uses the same word base as the 
word for "awake"). "Tak Ada Gambar Pak Harto dalam Uang 50 Ribuan," Jawa Pos, December 3,1998.
3 The managing editor of Yogyakarta's newspaper, Kedaulatan Rakyat, recalls receiving a call from the 
Department of Information specifically warning him not to run a photo of the burning effigy (personal 
interview, April 27,1999, at a seminar on journalistic photography at the Indonesian Islamic University in 
Yogyakarta). According to an award-winning investigative report in Gadjah Mada University's well- 
respected news magazine, an intelligence agent who was captured and interrogated by students had in his 
wallet the name of the student who made the Suharto effigy burned in the April 4,1998 demonstration, as 
well as the names of other students who burned Suharto's photograph. See "Menguak Jaringan Inteligen di 
Kampus Biru," Balairung, edisi khusus V X 1999, p. 57. Two students, who were mysteriously shot at in 
Yogyakarta on separate occasions in the spring of 1998 (before Suharto's fall), had been involved in the 
burning of Suharto's image in the April 4,1998 action. It is believed that this is one of the reasons they were 
targeted by intelligence agents. Ibid., pp. 63-4.
4 "'HM Suharto' Dihukum Denda," Kompas, June 22,1999; see also "Luhut MP Pangaribuan Soal Topeng 
di Persidangan. Wibawa Peradilan Telah Runtuh," Kompas, June 25,1999.
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Following Suharto's resignation, the image of the rupiah bill bearing Suharto's 
benign smile and downcast eyes became an instantly recognizable shorthand that 
distilled a constellation of discourses on New Order corruption and abuse of power. 
Discussions were soon underway in the press about who would replace him on the 
fifty thousand rupiah bill. For the time being, though, the bill with the face of "the 
smiling general" stayed in circulation. The very fact that the bill was still in use 
powerfully evoked the widespread belief, throughout late 1998 and well into 2000, 
that Suharto was still active in the political world—that he still had, in all senses of 
the word, currency.5 The fifty thousand rupiah bill appeared in many cartoons as a 
visual code for the idea that Suharto's money was behind various scandals and violent 
eruptions of conflict throughout Indonesia.6 During the political campaigns of spring 
1999, there were constant accusations that the New Order ruling party, Golkar, and 
several smaller parties were playing "money politics," and in these campaigns 
Suharto's bill figured again as the ultimate sign of political corruption.7
Then, several months into the campaign for the parliamentary elections of June 
1999, amidst literally hundreds of different party stickers and posters sold on street 
comers at rallies and in stalls along main commercial streets, a sticker emerged which 
placed Megawati Sukarno Putri's face on the infamous fifty thousand rupiah bill. As in 
almost all the political campaign images of Megawati (both mass-produced and hand- 
painted on small streetside "posts" set up by Megawati supporters), she is 
accompanied by her father: the "watermark" of the bill featured an image of Sukarno. 
Sukarno, the shadow figure always visible behind her, was the ultimate sign of political 
authenticity: the "original" Indonesian president and nationalist hero.8
Not long after, Mandate Party (PAN, Partai Amanat Nasional) supporters also 
came out with a fifty thousand rupiah sticker featuring Amien Rais. The scene of 
Amien Rais's wife handing these bills out to potential voters—mimicking Golkar's well- 
known practice of buying votes—elicted playful references to Amien's "simple" wife 
playing the elite game of "money politics."
5 This despite the fact that following a Time magazine expose of Suharto's family wealth, Suharto went on 
television before the Indonesian nation and swore he did not have "a single cent" in foreign banks and that 
if he had all the money Time claimed he did, he would have been more than happy to give it to the Indonesian 
people.
6 Throughout 1999 and into 2000, the fifty thousand rupiah bill appeared on many magazine covers as an 
illustration for lead articles on corruption and political scandals. See for example Tempo, December 13-18, 
1999; Tempo, March 13-19, 2000; Tempo, April 17-23, 2000.
7 A cartoon in Kedaulatan Rakyat, March 6,1999, shows a variety of party flags, one of which is actually a 
bill with Suharto's face on it, a sign that parties are being funded with Suharto's money. Another cartoon 
depicts a party orator who has a sheaf of fifty thousand rupiah bills poking out of his shirt collar instead 
of a head (reproduced in Berms, May 27,1999). At a demonstration against "money politics," students in 
Jakarta dressed up in costumes made entirely of photocopies of the fifty thousand rupiah bill. See Kompas, 
May 11, 1999.
8 Both Megawati detractors and supporters often claimed that Megawati's political charisma was a direct 
result of her familial connection to Sukarno. The money stickers establish this familial connection visually. 
Eventually PDIP money stickers were available in all denominations and a variety of versions. One sticker 
featured Sukarno rather than Megawati alongside the symbol for PDIP. Another showed Megawati next to 
her brother, with Sukarno in the background. Others showed Megawati and her father together as the 
central image of the bill.
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It turns out that the money politics practice that is so much the enemy of the 
Mandate Party is also done by Ny. Kusnasriyati Sri Rahayu. The wife of the 
Head of the Mandate Party, Prof. Amien Rais, even gave [money] out from the 
air while in a helicopter. . . . Don't misunderstand. The money politics done by 
Amien Rais and his wife is not that of handing out or circulating real money. 
Rather it is in the form of a sticker which in format and design imitates the fifty 
thousand rupiah note. The difference is that the amount of the denomination has 
been changed to fifteen [the official number of the Mandate Party among 
Indonesia's forty-eight parties], the picture of Suharto has been exchanged with a 
photo of Amien Rais, and the image is made complete with the Mandate Party 
symbol on the right side.9
Parties like PAN and Megawati's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) 
used their opposition status as capital in these sticker games to define themselves 
against Golkar with its infamous corrupt practices.10 Such antics allowed PAN in 
particular to join in the campaign fever while cultivating an ironic distance that would 
appeal to its more intellectual, urban middle-class followers (academics, students, and 
professionals).
But by far the most widespread were the Megawati money stickers, which seemed 
to gain in popularity following her party's victory in the national elections. Megawati 
herself had an urban populist following and cult status that the other candidates 
lacked; there were always more stickers for Megawati than for any other figure, and 
posters of Sukarno had long been popular among dissident youth as well as nostalgic 
elders.11 In addition to "inheriting" her father's charisma, Megawati had won a 
reputation for political authenticity in her own right for her refusal to accept being 
ousted by Suharto from the leadership of her party in 1996. Megawati also served as a 
sign of fiscal "cleanliness"; in the popular imagination, Megawati and the Sukarno 
family were often explicitly opposed to the Suhartos for not having profited off the 
people. The bills bore slogans such as dilarang korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme ("corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism forbidden"), and anti-kekerasaan ("against violence"). In place 
of the authenticating signatures of government officials appeared the as-if-handwritten 
reformasi keywords jujur ("honest") and adil ("just"). By joining Megawati, Sukarno, 
and slogans of reform, the money sticker transformed what had become a symbol of 
corruption back into a legitimate sign, a sign of political and moral authenticity. The 
money sticker moved simultaneously along planes of idealism and satire, earnestly
9 "'Money Politics' Ala Istri Amien Rais" Kedaulatan Rakyat, May 25,1999.
10 Though less frequent, there were also National Awakening Party (PKB) fifty thousand rupiah stickers 
showing the party's leader, Abdurrachman Wahid (Gus Dur), and, in Yogyakarta at least, there were some 
stickers showing Hamangkebuwono X, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, who was also considered a possible 
presidential candidate. Habibie and other Golkar leaders never appeared on these stickers; they could not 
have appropriated the symbolics of money and power in the same way as opposition figures could. Had 
they tried, the interpreted meaning would inevitably have been not that they were replacing Suharto with 
something new, but rather that they merely stood in his place, and in fact represented "Suharto with a 
different face" (Habibie appeared in some cartoons as a puppet with Suharto behind him) or a front for the 
continuation of the "status quo," as it was called in elite political discourse.
11 In 1967 the display of Sukarno's image in public places was banned by the New Order regime. The ban 
indicates the significance of these visual statements of political allegience. Kedaulatan Rakyat, July 12,1967.
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summing up popular reformist ideals while reveling in an over-the-top parody of 
authenticity itself.
Money sticker
Even if it merely toyed with the idea of replacing the existing currency, the sticker 
money was subversive. Its circulation raised the radical possibility drat the fetish of 
money should be exposed as mere fiction. In Indonesia, the fictionality of money had 
particular form: money might be revealed as a piece of paper that expresses not the 
mystical forces of an impersonal market but a personalized and corrupt form of 
political power.12 In a newspaper article, a PDIP leader, eager to distinguish the party 
elite from its more radical followers, denied that the stickers were being produced 
officially by the party:
This sticker could be being made by fanatic supporters of PDI Perjuangan, 
nevertheless, if it falls into the hands of people, especially those in the villages 
who are illiterate, it could have saddening consequences. Illiterate villagers who 
don't know that the fifty thousand rupiah bill with the picture of Mbak Mega is 
only a game will have problems . . . 13
The voices of the newspaper and the party leader align with the existing order in their 
tone of paternalistic concern and condescension. Failing to see that non-elites could be 
capable of irony and humor, they fear that the sticker money might just be taken 
seriously. The newspaper article reminds its readers that the "authentic" (asli) fifty
12 During the economic crisis that hit Indonesia in late 1997 and continues into the present, the severe 
plummeting of the rupiah against the dollar exposed the corruption corroding the Indonesian economic and 
financial system. At all levels of society, people felt like victims of forces beyond their control.
13 "Tarik, Stiker Model Uang Bergambar Mega," Kedaulatan Rakyat, May 3,1999. See also "Stiker Uang 
Rp. 50,000 Gambar Mega Laris Manis Dijual di Pinggir Jalan," Bernas, July 5,1999.
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thousand rupiah note with the face of Suharto "has also not yet been recalled and is 
still a legitimate [sah] means of purchasing." Whether stories of villagers mistaking the 
stickers for real money were elite legends of rural simplicity or actual events is 
irrelevant. That the stories spread in urban centers like Yogyakarta suggests that the 
circulation of this "money" was interpreted as a threat to the legitimacy of existing 
currency.
In fact, the legitimacy of money was already very much in question because of a 
significant problem with counterfeit money.14 During this same time period, there were 
frequent cases reported in the paper of false bills received from ATM machines and of 
police raids on counterfeiters. Both the army and Golkar were, at different points, 
implicated in the production of false money. During the pre-election campaigns, there 
were rumors that Golkar was handing out envelopes containing fake bills to their 
would-be supporters, thereby cheating both the democratic system and those who 
would be bribed. Interestingly, the press reported that the rupiah note most commonly 
counterfeited was that with Suharto's face on it, thus undermining public confidence 
not only in money in general, but in that bill in particular.15
The Megawati money stickers reverse the logic of the "aspal," a neologism that 
combines the words "asli" (authentic) and "palsu" (false)—an authentic counterfeit. 
An example of aspal, as James Siegel has noted, might be an official letter that was 
acquired through bribery or some kind of scheme, but which cannot be distinguished 
from an authentic letter because it bears the real stamp: it is the work of someone "on 
the inside."16 The money sticker, by contrast, is visibly false and makes no pretense of 
having been printed officially; but it lays claim to a kind of political authenticity 
precisely for that reason. Printed far from the centers of financial and political control, 
this fake money pokes fun at money's authenticating signs and, at the same time, 
imagines what authentic currency might look like.
Nor is the money sticker like counterfeit money, which ideally slips unnoticed into 
circulation. For it is, of course, a sticker, meant to be fixed in one place—and thus it 
violates one of the foundational principles of currency. Indeed, the sticker expressed a 
contradictory relationship to capitalism and the logic of money. On the one hand, the 
money sticker could only operate successfully because it was recognized as a sign of 
value and power. Purchased for one thousand to fifteen hundred rupiah 
(approximately fifteen to twenty cents), the sticker was itself a commodity. But what 
the stickers amounted to, in a sense, was a refusal of capitalism, for they enabled 
people to take money out of circulation, to hold it in abeyance, to possess it rather 
than have it possess them. The "value" of this money did not result from exchange, but 
from its use as a symbol of political alternatives and possibilities. The money sticker
14 For a series of articles on the problem of counterfeit money, see Forum April 16,2000, pp. 12-24.
15 See "Awas 'Suharto' Palsu di Mana-Mana," Forum, April 16,2000, pp. 12-13, and "Gunung Es 
Bergambar Suharto," Forum April 16, 2000, p. 22. The articles also note that the most dramatic rise in 
counterfeit bills occurred in May 1998 during the transition from Suharto to Habibie and the ensuing rush 
on banks by panicked citizens.
16 James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type in Jakarta (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), see Chapter 
Three. Bank Indonesia was also accused of circulating this kind of "aspal" money. See "Gunung Es 
Bergambar Suharto," Forum, April 16,2000, p. 20.
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thus represented money's antithesis even as it gained its semiotic currency from the 
logic of money.
One might say that these flagrant forgeries fulfilled what Benjamin called the 
revolutionary potential of mechanical reproduction.17 Benjamin noted that mechanical 
reproduction enables people to "get hold of" reality and bring it closer; here, the 
reproduced image allows people symbolically to grasp realms of money and power 
that are structurally beyond their reach.18 That the fake money sticker proved more 
popular than any other political sticker—showing up on cars, buses, becak (pedicabs), 
peddlers' stands, and in people's homes on doors, windows, and mirrors—suggests 
that these images captured better than any other political imagery the "aspirations of 
the people" (aspirasi rakyat).19 Not only did the stickers symbolically allow people to 
exert control over the distant forces of the economy, but they made an abundance of 
money physically part of the landscape of the urban lower class.20 Attached to the 
spaces of small-scale commerce and domestic life, the stickers made an abundance of 
money physically part of the everyday landscape of the urban lower class. At the 
same time, the stickers brought Megawati into intimate proximity, enacting the popular 
sentiment that Megawati was a leader who merakyat, who was "one with the 
people."21 Her face on the money sticker was not just an abstract sign of authority; it 
was, in some sense, a reflection of their own. The stickers thus allowed people to 
imagine a new, more direct and connected, relationship to the economy and to politics.
The money stickers approach the revolutionary potential of mechanical 
reproduction by undermining the authority of existing currency and expressing a 
popular revision of politics and money. Yet in their fixation on Megawati's image, the 
stickers rely on the "cult value" of the portrait photograph, the last holdout of the 
"aura" of original presence that, for Benjamin, truly revolutionary mechanical 
reproduction was destined to destroy.22 They reinvigorate rather than eliminate the 
"aura" of authenticity, and so embody, too, the dangerous potential for fascistic 
politics in the age of mechanical reproduction. For those (mostly middle class and 
well-educated) Indonesians who found Megawati's following too "fanatik," the money
17 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed. 
Hannah Arendt, trans. Howard Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968). Money is, of course, an odd 
example of the auratic object in that it is not an original in the sense of being a unique object located in a 
particular place and time. On the other hand, money bears the aura of authenticity through its singular 
origin in the state, its defining, authenticating physical properties (paper quality, water mark, metal strips, 
etc.), and the fact that it cannot be legitimately reproduced.
18 Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," p. 223.
19 The term “mewakili aspirasi rakyat" (representing the aspirations of the people), was the catchword of 
the election—the single phrase that was meant to sum up the meaning of democracy.
20 Many of Megawati's supporters in the urban lower class would rarely have held an actual fifty 
thousand rupiah bill. A becak driver in Yogyakarta may make as much as ten thousand rupiah a day. Skilled 
laborers (carpenters, for example) often make as little as seven thousand rupiah a day.
21 Obviously this discourse of Megawati's identification with "the people" echoes Sukamoist rhetoric. As 
one Megawati supporter, a woman in her mid-fifties, told me, "Megawati has the spirit of her father, the 
spirit of being one with the people." (Megawati punya jiwa bapaknya, jiwa merakyat).
22 Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," p. 226. See also Walter Benjamin, 
"A Short History of Photography," in Classic Essays on Photography, ed. Alan Trachtenberg (New Haven: 
Leete's Island Books, 1980), pp. 199-216.
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sticker was further evidence of Megawati's dangerous status as a populist icon. Rather 
than opening the giddy possibility of putting anybody in Suharto's place—as did the 
souvenir photos immediately following Suharto's fall—the money stickers provided a 
replacement. Irreverence and open possibilities had given way to a new form of 
worship.
Becak driver reads the paper while waiting for a passenger, Yogyakarta, March 2000.
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* * *
If reimagining money was one way that Megawati supporters expressed their desire 
to engage in the political process, a different but related way to articulate political 
aspirations emerged after Megawati won the majority vote in the June 1999 general 
election. Due to the fact that the Indonesian electoral system selects a president by 
parliamentary vote, winning a majority of the popular vote does not guarantee winning 
the presidential seat. Groups within Parliament quickly began forming alliances to 
defeat Megawati's bid for rule. To many of Megawati's supporters this seemed 
patently unjust, a betrayal of the people's will manifested in the election results. 
Groups of mostly young men began taking an "oath" to fight for her victory which 
culminated in pricking one's thumb and making a thumbprint in blood on a white sheet 
that would be displayed and then sent to Parliament. Other less "fanatik" and less 
gendered gestures of support included public signings of long white cloth banners by 
thousands of people in support of Megawati's candidacy for president.23 These hand- 
signed banners were a form of graffiti infringing on a medium (the street banner or 
spanduk) long monopolized by the government and official parties. Just as the money 
stickers symbolically put money and power in the hands of the wong cilik ("little 
people") who formed the base of Megawati's support, the cap jempol darah ("blood 
fingerprint") and the tandatangan ("signature," literally, "hand mark") appropriated 
the state's own indexical signs for identification in order to express her supporters' 
desire to make a mark on the political process.
As with the money sticker, party leaders denied that the action was orchestrated 
by the party, calling it instead a "pure" (murni) act by "citizens" (warga) sympathetic 
to Megawati.24 In media coverage of the participants in the blood fingerprint actions, 
the threatening term "masses" or "mob" (massa) appears infrequently and is not used 
self-referentially; rather, it tends to be used by critical elite commentators or editorially 
by the newspaper itself. Supporters of and participants in the action tend to use more 
neutral and positive terms, such as masyarakat ("people" or "the public") and rakyat 
("the people"). Perhaps most common, tellingly, was the term warga, which when used 
alone means "citizens" and when used in conjunction with other terms can mean 
"member of," as in warga PDIP ("PDIP followers") or warga masyarakat ("members of 
society"). By using the term warga, the supporters of the action asserted their 
legitimate rights as members of a political and social community, and refused the 
lawless and politically radical connotations of massa.
In the press, the blood fingerprint was depicted as a form of direct communication 
from the people to their leaders, rooted in "emotion" rather than "rationality." 
Horrified elite commentators referred to the blood thumbprint as a form of "political 
terror."25 Said one professor of political science, "This is very regrettable. It should be 
that problems having to do with the election and democracy are regarded rationally,
23 Though less popular, there were also some cap bibir, or lip print sheets, a feminized version of the blood 
thumbprint.
24 See "Cap Jempol Darah, Bukan PDI-P," Kedaulatan Rakyat, July 1,1999 and "Cap Darah Dilawan Jihad," 
Bernas, July 6,1999.
25 "Cap Darah Juga Menetes di Semarang," Berms, July 1,1999.
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not with emotion."26 In an article titled, "The Blood Thumbprint, Proof of the Return 
of Mythic Culture," another elite intellectual characterized the blood fingerprint as a 
survival from an era of blood sacrifice and a sign that Indonesian people are 
"extremely far from the modem culture of the industrial era."27 Dr. Djoko Saryono of 
IKIP (Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan) Malang is quoted in the article as saying, 
"it makes perfect sense that it will be difficult to eliminate corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism, because a mythical culture does not know rational terminology like 
efficiency, property rights, and black-on-white proof." The article quotes further: 
"concepts of nationalism, statism, democracy, the free market, which are purely 
modem concepts, obviously are very difficult to be understood by a mythical society."
Interestingly, Dr. Djoko Saryono opposes the blood thumbprint to the "black on 
white proof" essential to modem polities. He also describes this "mythical culture" as 
an "oral culture," identifying the blood fingerprints with a pre-literate society in which, 
he imagines, "blood sacrifice" was practiced to propitiate the spirits of "nature." Yet 
if blood evokes such elite fantasies of primitivity, completely ignored is the fact that 
these signs refer to one of the major rituals of modem biopower and bureaucracy. The 
fingerprint as a sign of identification, a proxy for the individual subject, is of course 
one of the most utterly "modem" of signs. The modem rite of fingerprinting (required 
for many official documents in Indonesia) has been a principal site of encounter 
between the state apparatus and the rakyat in Indonesia.28 It is participation in such 
state rituals—like the ritual of voting—that transforms individuals into warga.
Those who supported the blood fingerprint actions also emphasized the emotional 
connotation of blood, but gave it a positive cast. The blood print was seen as an 
authentic and direct "from the heart" form of communication, a "spontaneous" and 
"pure" outpouring of support.29 The fingerprint was called by one sympathetic 
journalist a "sincere effort in the search for a feeling of justice which during the New 
Order they [the people] never felt."30 It was interpreted as the people's response to the 
intricate, Machiavellian calculations of the party politicians who would ultimately 
determine who sat in the president's chair. In an article entitled, "PAN Supporters of 
East Java Do the Blood Fingerprint. The Silent Resistance Spreads," the blood 
fingerprint is seen as a mute but effective form of communication by those who have 
been silenced: "It turns out this blood fingerprint action is capable of answering the 
maneuvers of the political elite who want to get in the way of Indonesian Democratic
26 "Cap Jempol Darah Menggila," Kedaulatan Rakyat, June 30,1999.
27 "Cap Jempol Darah, Bukti Kembalinya Kebudayaan Mitis," Kompas, July 17,1999.
28 All Indonesian citizens above the age of seventeen must possess a Kartu Tanda Penduduk, a citizenship 
identification card. Identity is proved through a photograph and a signature and/or a fingerprint. In some 
contexts, the use of the fingerprint may be a mark of illiteracy. Here what might be a sign of shame is 
transformed into an authentic form of political communication.
29 See for example, "Cap Jempol Darah Rambah Magelang," Bernas, July 7,1999, where a local party 
official claims that this is "a pure, spontaneous action" (kegiatan itu murni spontanitas warga).
30 "Cap Darah Juga Menetes di Semarang," Bernas, July 1,1999.
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Party for Struggle leader Megawati's steps towards the presidential chair/' said one 
party leader.31
But alongside this language of emotion and resistance, the blood fingerprint was 
also frequently referred to by its supporters and practitioners as a form of "proof"—a 
reference to the legal apparatus to which the fingerprint is inevitably linked: "We are 
going to bring the proof [bukti] of these blood fingerprints to Senayan [Jakarta], and 
will give it to the institution or to whomever has authority in the matter of Megawati's 
candidacy for president," said one organizer of a fingerprint action in East Java.32 
Filling a spanduk with signatures rather than blood fingerprints, an action far less 
threatening to elites, was also seen as a form of communication authentic to the people 
yet framed in a language authority could hear: "At the very least, we will hang it along 
the road in front of the parliament building. So the members of parliament know the 
true feelings of the people," said a Megawati supporter.33 Another signer of the 
spanduk, a young woman, is quoted saying, "I only wish the facts of the field to 
speak."34
What is clear in these efforts is the sense of a break in communication between 
political elites and "the people" that emerged following the general election, when it 
became apparent that, despite her victory, Megawati might not win the presidency. 
Particularly for those in the urban lower class who formed Megawati's most ardent 
supporters, who had just been inundated with public service messages about voting 
and having their voices heard, there was a sense that this newly found voice was being 
taken away. In response, the signature and the fingerprint—authorized, indexical signs 
of identity—became alternative means of communication. Is it any surprise, given the 
urgency of these signals, that when Megawati failed to become president her 
supporters in several cities rioted? In Bali, they burned government buildings. In Solo, 
in addition to burning government complexes, the home of Amien Rais, who was seen 
as the key player in Megawati's defeat, was trashed by her supporters. Violence was 
narrowly averted in Jakarta by Megawati's televised and radio broadcast plea to her 
supporters to accept Wahid's victory, and by the immediate appearance of several key 
political figures, including Amien Rais, to address the disappointed masses gathered in 
the streets. Megawati's selection as vice president may have been the only way to avert 
mass violence. Is violence then the result of failed communication, or a last ditch 
attempt to be heard?
Money stickers and blood fingerprints are bound up in the play of authenticity and 
reproduction that seems to motor political communication in the reformasi era. 
Communication between "power" and "the people" cannot take place directly; it 
occurs by way of reproductions or proxies invested with codes of authenticity. The 
money sticker relies on reproductive technology to expose the pretensions of 
conventional signs of authority and to reimagine money as an authentic sign. The
31 "Warga PAN Jatim Ikut Lakukan Cap Jempol Darah. Perlawanan Diam Kini Meluas," Kedaulatan 
Rakyat, July 5,1999. Note that although PAN elites were instrumental in Megawati's defeat, at least some 
PAN supporters chose to align themselves with the popular sentiment that Megawati deserved to win.
32 "Cap Jempol Darah Menggila," Kedaulatan Rakyat, June 30,1999. See also '"Cap Jempol' Berubah 'Perang 
Darah,"' Kedaulatan Rakyat, July 4,1999.
33 "'John Lennon' pun Mendukung Megawati," Kompas, July 12,1999.
34 "Cap Darah Juga Menetes di Semarang," Bernas, July 1,1999.
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popular circulation of this unauthorized money as part of the political campaign is a 
mimicry and an ironic critique of the unauthorized use of money for political gain—and 
of political authority for financial gain—practiced by Suharto and his cronies. Any 
reproduction of money threatens to unravel the fetishistic power of money as a neutral 
medium representing market forces rather than human agency. But counterfeit money is 
merely false, whereas the sticker is false but true, a reproduction that is (perhaps) 
more authentic than the real thing. Like the money sticker, the cap jempol darah invests 
a reproduction with codes of authenticity. The fingerprint is a proxy for the individual 
subject within the language of signs recognized by the modem bureaucratic state. The 
vote has proved an inadequate form of "voice," so individuals who have been silenced 
seek to communicate by appropriating the language of bureaucratic rationalism, legal 
proof, and state control. But the use of blood rather than ink deepens the indexicality 
of the sign and conveys identity overlaid with the suggestion of violence and emotion.
If money stickers tapped popular sentiments of irreverence and hopeful 
anticipation, the blood fingerprints registered increasing frustration as the political 
drama of the elections unfolded. While the money stickers reproduced money in order 
to pull it out of circulation and bring it closer to the people, the fingerprint-filled 
spanduk attempted to put the people into circulation, to represent them in an exchange 
of political signs from which they had been unexpectedly excluded. Both money 
stickers and blood fingerprints were attempts at communicating popular sentiments 
via authentic reproductions; both were messages that never quite arrived in the elite 
centers to which they were addressed.
